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Two years after the large victory by Ma Ying-jeouand the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan’s presi-dential and legislative polls, the new KMT admin-
istration and president are facing high levels of discontent
among the Taiwanese. Although Ma’s honeymoon with
the electorate was bound to be short given the numerous
economic and political challenges Taiwan was facing in
2008, his dramatic slide in popularity has surprised many
observers. (1) The Ma government’s rapprochement policy
with China has seen some significant results and earned
support and applause in most foreign capitals. But the way
this policy has been conducted, and a series of missteps
and shortcomings by the government and Ma himself,
have combined with the global economic crisis to generate
a serious crisis of confidence among the public regarding
the administration’s competence and its ultimate attach-
ment to Taiwan’s interests and sovereignty in relation to
China. This article will look in greater detail at the first
two years of Ma’s administration and its policies, their
level of success, and the opposition they have encoun-
tered. It will address the main challenges faced by the ad-
ministration: relations with China, the economy, domestic
politics and regional elections, and the question of na-
tional identity.
The  pol ic i es  and achievementsof  Ma Ying- jeou and the KMTsince  2008 
In 2008, the legislative and presidential elections gave the
KMT an overwhelming hold on all national political institu-
tions. In the parliament, the KMT and its allies in the Blue
camp (the PFP and the NP) won around 55 percent of the
vote and more than two-third of the seats of the new 113-
seats Legislative Yuan (LY), reinforcing their majority and
the control of legislative affairs they have exercised continu-
ously in Taiwan since the end of the 1940s. In the presiden-
tial poll, the Kuomintang ticket of Ma Ying-jeou and vice-
president Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang) won decisively,
with 58.5 percent against the 41.5 percent for their Demo-
cratic Progressive Party (DPP) opponents Frank Hsieh
Chang-ting and Su Tseng-chang. (2) Riding the wave of dis-
satisfaction against the DPP administration and former pres-
ident Chen Shui-bian, embroiled in corruption scandals and
criticised for poor handling of the country’s economy, admin-
Mid-Term Analysis of the 
Ma Ying-jeou Administration
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1. Shelley Rigger, “Ma’s Puzzling Midterm Malaise,” Brookings Northeast Asia
Commentary, no. 37, 11 March 2010.
2. Cf. Frank Muyard, “Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou’s Victory and the KMT’s
Return to Power,” China Perspectives, no. 73, 2008/1, pp. 79-94.
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Since his election as Taiwan’s president in 2008, Ma Ying-jeou has embarked on an active policy of rapprochement
with China, leading to the signing of a string of economic and technical agreements with Beijing that have further
liberalised and normalised cross-strait economic relations. But the way this rapprochement has been conducted,
coupled with the economic crisis that has struck Taiwan for most of the first two years of Ma’s administration and a
series of missteps and mismanagements by the president and the Kuomintang (KMT) government, have generated a
crisis of confidence and widespread discontent among the Taiwanese. This has resulted in consistently low approval
ratings and several setbacks in regional and by-elections in 2009 and 2010, as well as the resurgence of a reformed
opposition under the leadership of Tsai Ing-wen. The discrepancy between Ma’s increasingly apparent Chinese
nationalism and the Taiwan-centred national identity of the majority is further indication of a significant disconnect
between the KMT administration and the Taiwanese mainstream.
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istrative affairs, and external relations, especially with China
and the United States, Ma Ying-jeou led a campaign based
on three pillars: reviving the economy, rapprochement with
China, and the fight against corruption, together with a strong
commitment to Taiwan’s sovereignty and identity. His “6-3-3”
economic program promised a 6 percent yearly GDP growth,
less than 3 percent employment, and a per capita GDP of
US$30,000 by 2016. Ma also advocated closer economic re-
lations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) — pre-
sented in pragmatic terms as the best way to improve the Tai-
wanese economy and the stability in the region — starting with
the establishment of the three direct links (air, sea, and
postal) between the two sides, and the opening of Taiwan to
Chinese tourists and Chinese investment. On the cross-strait
political front, Ma announced a policy of “no unification, no
independence, and no use of force,” with the commitment not
to undertake negotiations on unification during his tenure. In
domestic affairs, Ma promised a highly efficient and compe-
tent administration to reverse the DPP’s alleged incompe-
tence and corruption. Finally, he called for a politics of na-
tional reconciliation after eight years of partisan polarisation.
Taiwan-China relations
The rapprochement between Taiwan and China has been at
the core of the KMT’s national policies since its return to
power, and it is here that the most concrete results can be
seen. Three aspects of this policy will be analysed here:
cross-strait agreements, the Taiwan sovereignty issue, and
Taiwan’s international space. Although improvements to
cross-strait relations were expected with the new administra-
tion in power, Ma’s government surprised many with the
speed and primary focus it put on dealing with Beijing,
rather than concentrating on economic revival as declared in
his presidential campaign. One reason is that the KMT ac-
tually views the future economic development of Taiwan as
dependent on its integration within the Chinese economic
sphere, while its goal of eventual unification is seen as pred-
icated on an intensification of economic and cultural rela-
tions with China. Ma’s and the KMT’s new China policy
therefore advocates a gradual economic, symbolic, and polit-
ical rapprochement with China with four objectives: lower-
ing political and military tension in the Formosa Strait,
strengthening economic ties with China to closely integrate
the two economies and eventually form a kind of common
market, countering the Taiwanese independence movement,
and preparing favourable conditions for a possible unifica-
tion in a still undetermined future. 
In practice, the 20 May 2008 inauguration of Ma as the 
Republic of China (ROC)'s president was followed rapidly
by the resumption of official talks with the PRC through the
established channels of semi-governmental entities, the Strait
Exchange Foundation (SEF) for Taiwan and the Association
for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) for China.
Their first meeting in 10 years took place in Beijing in June
2008 and signed off on agreements on direct weekend char-
ter flights and the opening of Taiwan to Chinese tourists com-
ing directly from China. These agreements were largely nego-
tiated and concluded in 2007 by the previous Chen adminis-
tration, but had been delayed by Beijing to await the KMT’s
return to power. Since then, “Chiang-Chen meetings” be-
tween the SEF and the ARATS have taken place every six
months, (3) resulting by the end of 2009 in a total of 12 tech-
nical agreements between the two sides on regular direct pas-
senger and cargo flights, sea links, postal service links, Chi-
nese tourists, food safety, crime fighting and judicial mutual as-
sistance, standards and metrology, agricultural product inspec-
tion and quarantine, fishing crews, and financial cooperation,
as well as three separate financial memoranda of understand-
ing (MOU). (4) Taipei also adopted a series of unilateral meas-
ures to facilitate economic relations with China. It has ex-
tended access to the direct mini-links (through the Kinmen
and Matsu islands), authorised exchange of the PRC cur-
rency, the renminbi, in Taiwan, raised the maximum limits of
Taiwanese investments in China, authorised Taiwan’s mayors
and county chiefs to travel in China, relaxed restrictions on
Taiwanese investment in foreign funds with Chinese assets,
simplified the process of hosting Chinese professional experts
in Taiwan, and relaxed rules for initial public offering of for-
eign companies and for investment by Chinese funds in the
Taiwanese Stock Exchange. As a result, the door to China is
now open for most Taiwanese high-technology investments as
well as banking, insurance, and financial investments, although
with some limits in term of the quantity of capital and re-
sources and of the levels of technology poured into Chinese
operations to ensure that these companies maintain a strong
base in Taiwan. Chinese investments in 100 sectors of the
economy are now also allowed for the first time. (5) In May
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3. The Chiang-Chen tag refers to the names of the two main negotiators, the chairman of
the SEF, Chiang Pin-kun, and the chairman of ARATS, Chen Yunlin.
4. For the details of these cross-strait agreements and their negotiations, as well as the
Ma government’s current Mainland policies, cf. the websites of Taiwan’s Mainland
Affairs Council (MAC), http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67145&CtNode=
5710&mp=1, and SEF,  http://www.sef.org.tw/lp.asp?ctNode=4382&CtUnit=2567&Base
DSD=21&mp=300.
5. Ting-I Tsai, “In Big Shift, Taiwan Allows Investment From China,” Wall Street Journal, 1
July 2009.
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2010, Taipei opened a tourism office in Beijing, followed by the
opening of a similar tourism office by the PRC in Taipei, the
first quasi-official institutions of either side in the other’s terri-
tory. (6) Intense negotiations have also been held over a cross-
strait economic and free trade agreement under the name
ECFA (Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement),
which was finally signed at the end of June 2010 (see below).
All these agreements signal much-improved relations be-
tween Taiwan and China, both economically and politically.
Less clear, however, are the concrete benefits of this closer
interaction for the majority of the population, which is
mainly concerned with economic improvement after two
years of stagnation and recession. Furthermore, Ma’s China
policies are vehemently opposed by the DPP-led Green
camp, which criticises the political underpinning of the cur-
rent cross-strait talks and Ma’s “One-China” framework and
denounces the risk of over-dependence entailed by a closer
economic integration with China. The non-transparent meth-
ods employed in Ma’s policy of rapprochement, and its am-
biguity over the nature of the Taiwanese state, is also a grow-
ing source of anxiety among the Taiwanese. 
The conclusion of these cross-strait agreements was indeed
made possible by mutual acceptance of the so-called “1992
consensus,” (7) Ma’s acquiescence to the “One China” prin-
ciple or a version of it, and avowed rejection of formal inde-
pendence for Taiwan as a separate state. While rejecting any
claim of sovereignty by the PRC over Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou
and the KMT support the view that Taiwan is the ROC, a
Chinese independent and sovereign state since its founding
in 1912, and as such does not need to reassert its independ-
ence. The ambiguity behind these diverging assertions is at
the core of the mutual understanding between the two sides
that enables them to enter into talks: it assures that both
sides officially pursue a “One China policy” and reject the
concepts of “Two Chinas” or “One China, One Taiwan”
promoted in one form or another by former presidents Lee
Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian, and which better reflect the
reality on the ground.
While helpful in dealing with China, this lack of clarity on
the status of Taiwan has generated strong opposition in Tai-
wan, especially after a series of statements by Ma suggesting
much deeper Chinese nationalism than he expressed in his
presidential campaign. Ma’s affirmation of a strong Tai-
wanese identity and defence of Taiwan’s sovereignty and
dignity before the 2008 elections did much to appease Tai-
wanese people’s worries about his sense of national belong-
ing, and allowed for the first democratic election of a Main-
lander as president of Taiwan. Once in power, however, Ma
and his ministers have constantly emphasised the Republic
of China and the belonging of the Taiwanese to the Chinese
nation or ethnicity (Zhonghua minzu) at the expense of Tai-
wan and the Taiwanese identity when referring to the coun-
try’s name and its “true” national identity. (8) As opposed to
the DPP and Lee Teng-hui’s KMT, which stated that Tai-
wan is the ROC and the ROC is Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou
only adheres to the first statement and with an important
twist: Taiwan is the ROC now, but only part of it, while the
ROC is not limited to Taiwan and includes mainland China.
While this statement mirrors Beijing’s definition of the PRC
and its claim of territorial sovereignty over Taiwan, this is a
radical departure from the consensus gradually formed in
Taiwan since 1991, when Lee Teng-hui’s government aban-
doned all claims on mainland China. In an interview with
the Mexican daily El Sol in September 2008, Ma stated
that both Taiwan and mainland China are “regions” of the
ROC under the ROC constitution, a position reiterated
since then by the presidential office. For Ma Ying-jeou, re-
lations between Taiwan and China are not state-to-state as
they were for Chen Shui-bian (a country on each side of the
strait, yi bian yi guo), or “special state-to-state relations”
(teshu guo yu guo guanxi) as for Lee Teng-hui, but “special
relations between region-to-region on equal-footing”
(duideng de diqu dui diqu teshu de guanxi) within the
framework of the ROC constitution. (9) This retrogression of
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6. “Taiwan Opens Tourism Office in Beijing,” United Daily News, 4 May 2010.
7. An expression invented by the former minister of the Taiwanese Mainland Affairs Council
(MAC), Su Chi, in February 2000, which contends that in discussions between the SEF
and the ARATS in 1992 in Singapore, the two sides agreed to recognise “One China with
different interpretations” (yi zhong ge biao), leading to the signing of the first set of tech-
nical agreements between Taiwan and China. Such a “1992 consensus” was however
never acknowledged by the Lee Teng-hui administration or by the PRC during the
1990s. On the basis of formal negotiation documents and the advice of Lee Teng-hui,
the Chen Shui-bian administration rejected the Su Chi invention. Ma Ying-jeou
announced after his electoral victory that his administration would recognise it togeth-
er with the “One China” principle, with the caveat of different interpretations, meaning
that for Taipei the “One China” refers to the Republic of China (ROC). The PRC does not
recognise this reading, holding that both sides agreed on “One China” in 1992, and
demanding it as a condition for any talks with Taiwan. Su Chi was Ma’s National Security
Council Chief from May 2008 to February 2010.
8. A polysemic term, minzu can mean nation, nationality, ethnic group, or a national group
with no recognised claim to nation-state status (as in shaoshu minzu, the “national
minorities” of the PRC). In Taiwan, minzu has a strong ethno-cultural meaning. To trans-
late the idea of nation as a “nation-state,” minzu has been replaced in contemporary
scholarship by the neologism guozu. Ethnic group is rendered by zuqun. Ethnology is
translated by minzuxue. The use of Zhonghua minzu by Ma Ying-jeou reflects the under-
pinnings of his Chinese nationalism, where the nation is seen in essentialist and cultur-
alist terms based on blood-based filiation and ethnic origins. For Ma, both sides of the
Taiwan Strait belong to one Chinese ethnic nation (and all Chinese and Taiwanese, as Ma
has said rhetorically several times, are the descendants of the mythical Yellow Emperor)
beyond their distinct citizenships, histories, and political trajectories. This is in strong con-
trast with the way Taiwanese now perceive themselves (see last part of this article).
9. Cf. Ko Shu-ling, “‘State To State’ Theory is Dead, Ma Says,” Taipei Times, 4 September
2008, and Ko Shu-ling, “Ma Refers to China as ROC Territory in Magazine Interview,”
Taipei Times, 8 October 2008.
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Taiwan to a mere “region” rather than an independent coun-
try under the name of the ROC places Taiwan under a
Greater China framework, and not only denies the right of
self-determination to the Taiwanese but also reduces their
identity and sense of specific historical development to a
provincial identity and peculiarity within a greater Chinese
nation. Compounded by the inability of Ma Ying-jeou to
have Chen Yunlin address him as Taiwan’s president during
his visit to Taiwan for the second Chiang-Chen meeting in
December 2008, these statements have generated wide-
spread ill-will among the Taiwanese, even within the Blue
camp, regarding Ma, his China policy, and his inability to
defend Taiwan’s national dignity. The growing assertion of
Chinese nationalism by Ma Ying-jeou and his government,
in line with the KMT old guard around Lien Chan, Wu Po-
hsiung, and most of the KMT second-generation mainlander
politicians, heralds a return to the KMT’s pre-Lee Teng-hui
Chinese-centred ideology, which ignores the two past
decades of democratisation and Taiwanisation. 
All the same, the sensitivity surrounding Taiwan’s political
status has led Ma to reject any political talks with China up
to now. (10) Unhappy with the lack of clarity and progress on
this front, Beijing tried to put pressure on Ma in the fall of
2009, but was obliged to backtrack since Taipei was
nowhere near ready to touch upon the issue. (11) Not only is
there no consensus in Taiwan about such talks, but the issue
could easily turn into a minefield for the KMT, already sus-
pected of surrendering Taiwan’s sovereignty through the
string of cross-strait agreements with China and in interna-
tional affairs. Some limited overtures for a peace agreement
and CBM (Confidence Building Measures) were aired but
have since been pushed back, and any progress would first
need to satisfy Ma’s promise not to enter into peace talks
without a prior removal of PRC missiles directed at Tai-
wan. (12)
In terms of Taiwan’s international space, some progress has
been made. As an extension of the understanding over a
“One China” principle with Beijing, Ma proposed a “diplo-
matic truce” and a policy of “mutual non-denial,” meaning
that both sides should avoid negating the other’s existence
and refrain from poaching the other’s diplomatic allies. (13)
Taiwan publicly renounced all forms of checkbook diplo-
macy, which had been going on for two decades in an in-
tense competition with Beijing, both sides offering develop-
mental aid packages and other perks to foreign countries to
maintain or gain diplomatic recognition. In a break with past
practice since 1993, the Ma administration has also declined
to file an official request for Taiwan’s membership in the
UN over the past two years. (14) While justifying this low-pro-
file strategy with the lack of success of previous attempts, the
government did not unveil any clear new policy on Taiwan’s
international space other than to focus on its incremental
progress in gaining observer status in UN-related technical
organisations.
This truce seems to have been partly respected in practice,
albeit not officially recognised, by the PRC. Since 2008,
Taiwan has not lost any diplomatic allies (which now num-
ber 23, mainly located in Central and South America,
Africa, and the Pacific), even though newly elected gov-
ernments in Paraguay, Nicaragua, and El Salvador had for-
merly indicated their wish to switch recognition to Beijing.
Taiwan was also granted observer status at the WHA (the
annual Assembly of the World Health Organization) in
May 2009, and again in 2010, a long-time goal of succes-
sive administrations in Taipei and the first opportunity for
an official, if still restricted, extension of Taiwan’s interna-
tional contacts in a UN-related forum. (15) In the Asia-Pa-
cific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the nomination of
former Vice-President and Prime Minister Lien Chan as
Taiwan’s representative at the 2008 and 2009 APEC
head-of-states meeting in Peru and Singapore was hailed in
some quarters as progress for Taipei, still barred by Beijing
from sending its president or foreign minister. The fact that
Beijing favoured the choice of Lien Chan, one of the most
pro-China KMT politicians and initiator of the 2005
KMT-PCC anti-Taiwan independence platform, did not,
however, dissipate feelings within the Green camp that
Ma’s efforts to increase Taiwan’s diplomatic space remain
firmly under Beijing’s control. Indeed, apart from the
WHA case, which both Taipei and Western countries re-
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10. Howard Schneider, “Taiwan’s Ma Sets Limits on China Policy,” Washington Post, 7 May
2010.
11. “No Consensus on China and Taiwan’s ‘1992 Consensus’,” Central News Agency, 14
November 2009; “PRC Draws Bottom Line on Taiwan for KMT,” Taiwan News, 17
November 2009. See also Alan Romberg, “The Winter of PRC Discontent,” China
Leadership Monitor, no. 31, Winter 2010.
12. Cf. “Time Not Ripe for Cross-strait Military CBM Talks,” United Daily News, 18 March
2010; “Taiwan to China: Remove Missiles Before Peace Talks,” Reuters, 6 April 2010. On
the security aspects of the Ma administration’s relations with China, cf. Jean-Pierre
Cabestan, "The New Détente in the Taiwan Strait and Its Impact on Taiwan's Security
and Future, in this issue of China Perspectives.
13. “‘Mutual Non-Denial’ Remains, Ma Says,” Taipei Times, 6 April 2008.
14. “No Bid for Full UN Membership,” Taipei Times, 16 August 2008; “No New UN Bid this
Year: MOFA,” Taipei Times, 13 August 2010. 
15. The name and status of Taiwan at the WHA seems, however, to follow Chinese dictates
to include it as part of the PRC, and therefore has aroused the strong opposition of the
DPP, which sees this as an example of the loss of sovereignty and national dignity
implied by Ma’s diplomatic policy. Cf. Vincent Y. Chao, “Former Official Laments Nation’s
Title at WHA,” Taipei Times, 6 May 2010.
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garded as a litmus test for the PRC to demonstrate some
good-will in return for Ma’s overtures and concessions, Bei-
jing has not shown any flexibility or conceded any space,
either in discourse or in action, regarding Taiwan’s partici-
pation in international forums, even smaller ones such as
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and
the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UN-
FCCC). If this situation does not improve, and China
does not respond more significantly to the Taiwanese pop-
ulation’s requests for better international representation for
the island, both Ma and China risk losing all trust from the
Taiwanese population on this low-key policy. While the
majority of the Taiwanese are in favour of détente in the
strait and maintaining the status quo, polls show that they
also consistently demand respect for their sovereignty and
independence, and yearn for international status and recog-
nition. 
Taken as a whole, the political détente in the Taiwan Strait
and the signing of technical agreements with Beijing that
make business and transportation links with China much
easier are important achievements for the Ma administra-
tion, and as such have received much support from most for-
eign capitals. Their possible cost in terms of Taiwan’s sover-
eignty and autonomy, obvious to the opposition in Taiwan,
is perceived less clearly abroad, where the main concern is
securing a stable and peaceful cross-strait situation, and
where the reality and depth of Taiwan’s distinct sense of na-
tional identity is still far from widely understood. Yet some
anxiety about a too-close alignment of Taipei with Beijing
was expressed in Tokyo and Washington, and Japan was es-
pecially shocked by the expression of a strong anti-Japanese
stance by Ma’s government after an incident around the
Diaoyutai Islands (Senkaku in Japanese) just after the new
administration took office. (16) Since then, Taipei has worked
harder to reassure its traditional allies that Ma’s new em-
brace of China will not be at the expense of their interests
in the region. Taiwan recently signed a major memorandum
of understanding to expand cooperation and exchanges with
Tokyo to re-launch and improve the traditional close rela-
tions between the two countries and their peoples. (17) The
Obama administration, for its part, has been supportive of
Ma’s policies and has allowed him to transit the US several
times en route to visiting Taiwan’s allies in the Western
Hemisphere. Some frictions nevertheless arose following the
fiasco created by the Ma government’s missteps around the
re-authorisation of the sale of US beef in Taiwan, and some
important meetings to advance the TIFA negotiations were
cancelled. (18)
It is of the greatest importance for Taiwan to preserve Wash-
ington’s support, since the one area where no progress at all
has been made in cross-strait relations is the military sphere.
Beijing has not only declined to answer Ma’s call for removal
of its missiles aimed at Taiwan, but has actually increased
their number and capacity, as well as the overall military
power directed to Taiwan and intended to deter US military
assistance to Taiwan in case of an armed conflict in the For-
mosa Strait. (19) The Obama administration’s recent authori-
sation of arm sales to Taiwan was also received with Bei-
jing’s loudest condemnation in years, including a call to boy-
cott US companies and threats of retaliation by China (all
directed at Washington without a single criticism addressed
to Taipei). Actually, the US arm sale package had already
been announced by the former Bush administration and is
far from sufficient to redress the military balance in the
Strait. As the ensuing months demonstrated, Beijing seemed
to have over-shot in this case, and combined with other un-
timely and unfriendly actions and declarations in various
fields of interaction with the West in Winter 2009-2010, it
led to an anti-Beijing backlash and growing concern among
Western democracies that China’s rise would not be as
peaceful as it claims. (20) Meanwhile, the military balance of
power in the Strait is now tilting decisively toward the PRC,
and without new purchases of relatively advanced weapons
such as the F-16 C/D requested by Taipei, both Taiwan and
the US run the risk of surrendering so much military ground
to Beijing that they would be unable to effectively defend
the island in the future. (21)
Taiwan’s  economy under  Ma
The economic situation since Ma’s arrival in power has been
very poor, and has weighed heavily on the public perception
of the ability and efficiency of Ma and his government. Ma
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16. “Taiwan Recalls its Japan Envoy over Diaoyutai Islands Clash,” China Post, 15 June
2008; I-chung Lai, “Taiwan and the Changing Strategic Balance in the East China Sea,”
China Brief, vol. 9, no. 24, 3 December 2009.
17. Martin Williams, “Taiwan, Japan Sign Memorandum to Enhance Ties,” Kyodo, 30 April
2010.
18. Cf. Ting-I Tsai, “Taiwan Leader Vows to Repair U.S. Ties,” Wall Street Journal, 6 January
2010; Alan Romberg, “Weathering the Storm,” China Leadership Monitor, no. 30, Fall
2009.
19. Cf. Russell Hsiao, “China-Taiwan Up Missile Ante,” China Brief, vol. 10, no. 7, 1 April
2010; Richard Fisher, “The Implications of China’s Naval Modernization for the United
States,” International Assessment and Strategy Center, 11 June 2009, http://www.strat-
egycenter.net/research/pubID.199/pub_detail.asp#.
20. Cf. Alan Romberg, “The Winter of PRC Discontent,” op. cit.
21. David A. Shlapak, “Questions of Balance: The Shifting Cross-Strait Balance and
Implications for the U.S.,” Rand Corporation, CT 343, March 2010.
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was elected on a platform of strong economic growth and
economic competence. Both were absent during the first two
years of his administration, even before the US and interna-
tional financial crisis. The Ma government’s record now con-
trasts negatively with the situation he inherited from the
DPP. Contrary to the KMT’s propaganda depicting a state
of economic disaster before the 2008 elections, the Tai-
wanese economy under the DPP administration was actu-
ally doing pretty well in terms of economic growth, exports,
technological achievement, product quality, and wealth cre-
ation, finishing with a very strong 6.88 percent year-on-year
growth in the first quarter 2008, after 5.98 percent in
2007. (22) It had nevertheless been facing for a number of
years problems related to growing social inequality, salary-
based income stagnation, lower purchasing power, and in-
dustrial hollowing out due to the transfer of entire industries
to China in search of a better cost-structure. All are deep
structural problems that point to a lack of proper wealth dis-
tribution and insufficient domestic investment, and call for a
difficult overall transformation and upgrading of the eco-
nomic structure and socio-economic policies. (23) As the econ-
omy is taking off again in 2010, the KMT government will
now have to address the very same problems – even more
acute since the economic crisis – that dogged the otherwise
strong economic performance of the DPP, or risk facing the
same rebuttal from the electorate in the next elections.
The impact of the 2007 US subprime crisis on Taiwan
started even before the financial meltdown of September
2008, so close are Taiwan’s economic links to the US con-
sumer market. (24) The crisis struck Taiwan with full force in
the fourth quarter of 2008, resulting in 0.73 percent growth
in 2008 and the worst recession in modern Taiwan history
in 2009, although finally relatively constrained on a yearly
basis at -1.91 percent thanks to the beginning of a recovery
in the fourth quarter. Unemployment jumped to more than
6 percent in mid-2009, its highest level on record, from a
low of 3.9 percent in early 2008, while the 2009 per capita
GDP fell back to its 2006 level at around US$17,000. (25)
Ma Ying-jeou’s government cannot be blamed for the impact
of the world recession on Taiwan’s economy. Nevertheless,
for someone who promised a new economic miracle, his ad-
ministration was clearly unprepared and showed few results
in dealing with the crisis, contrary to all expectations and the
KMT’s own public discourse. All too focused on its dealings
with China, the government did not anticipate the crisis, un-
derestimated it when it struck, and was largely ineffectual in
alleviating its effects on the economy. The short-term stimu-
lus measures the government devised were for most part
costly and inefficient (e.g., the consumption voucher pro-
gram), or had unintended negative effects (such as the in-
centive program for student internships, which depressed
entry-level salaries). The massive US$26 billion four-year
spending plan, part of Ma’s “12 i-Taiwan projects” economic
platform, including US$15 billion on infrastructure projects
and US$6 billion to create more competitive industries, was
slow to start and largely ineffective due to the usual bureau-
cratic red tape and rigid budgeting practices. The lack of
much-needed public investment in 2008 and 2009 was also,
ironically, a result of the KMT-controlled parliament’s earlier
scorched-earth politics, which blocked or reduced the size of
all major infrastructure programs proposed by the DPP ad-
ministration and regularly cut the budgets of government
agencies and ministries for the political showdown before
2008.
The KMT’s economic policy is essentially based on a phi-
losophy of opening to China, free trade, tax cuts, and infra-
structure development with a strong emphasis on big corpo-
rations and high-tech companies. The belief is this will help
stimulate production and exports as well as attract investment
from foreign and overseas-based Taiwan companies, and
lead to higher growth and employment. Major corporate and
individual tax cuts were introduced in 2009 and 2010, but
without any compensating measures to balance the shortfall
in state revenues, leading to growing budget deficits and pub-
lic debt that are worrying economic experts. (26) Fiscal pres-
sure in Taiwan is now at a record low of 12 percent of GDP
and well below that of similarly developed economies.
These measures also accentuate income disparity, and
oblige the salary-based middle class to bear the brunt of the
fiscal pressure while property taxes are undervalued and
gains on property and stock transactions are virtually un-
taxed. (27) Meanwhile, real estate speculation in Taiwan, and
especially in the Taipei area, partly fed by offshore capital
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22. Cf. Frank Muyard, “Taiwan Elections 2008,” op. cit., pp. 89-92. On the 2008-2010 fig-
ures, cf. DGBAS, “Key Economic and Social Indicators, July 30, 2010” (figures calculat-
ed based on 2006 constant prices), http://eng.stat.gov.tw/lp.asp?CtNode=2191
&CtUnit=1050&BaseDSD=7&mp=5.
23. On the Taiwanese economy, cf. Philippe Chevalerias, "The Taiwanese Economy After the
Miracle: An Industry in Restructuration, Structural Weaknesses and the Challenge of
China, in this issue of China Perspectives.
24. Cf. Peter C.Y. Chow, “The Impact of the Financial Tsunami on Taiwan’s Economy,” in 
B. Wakefield (ed.), Taiwan and the Global Economic Storm, Asia Program Special Report,
Woodrow Wilson International Center, no.143, October 2009, pp. 5-12.
25. Cf. DGBAS figures, “Key Economic and Social Indicators, 30 July 2010,” op. cit.
26. “Stunned by the So-Called Tax Reform,” Commercial Times, 20 April 2010; “Auditor
Warns of Worsening National Debt Situation,” Central News Agency, 28 July 2010.
27. Monique Hou, “Tax System Controversy: Taiwan, ‘Island of Inequity’?”, CommonWealth
Magazine, no. 445, 22 April 2010.
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inflows and large amounts of idle funding, has created a bub-
ble that puts housing out of reach for the middle class. This
has added to the strong dissatisfaction against government
policies perceived as favouring only the well off. (28)
In the past two years, most policies were oriented toward
China and Taiwan-China relations rather than toward Tai-
wan’s national economy, its transformation, support of long-
term consumption and purchasing power, or export diversifi-
cation, as Ma’s administration seems intent on keeping all its
bets on the “magic Chinese bullet.” Unfortunately for Ma,
this China policy has not delivered much of the promised
economic benefits to the population. While the government-
financed stimulus in China helped cushion the blow of the
global market collapse in 2009, both the value of Taiwanese
exports to China and Taiwan’s share of Chinese imports de-
clined in 2009, (29) and most of the export recovery unfolding
now is linked once again to renewed growth in the US and
other developed markets, as well as in all the emerging
economies. The projected bonanza of business opportunities
to be generated by the direct links and arrival of Chinese
tourists did not materialise. The opening of direct flights
with China (370 a week by September 2010) and lowering
of cross-strait passenger and cargo transportation costs, while
welcomed by tourists and Taiwanese doing business in
China (Taishang), bring little benefit to the majority who
seldom or never visit the mainland. (30) The economic bene-
fit of the arrival of Chinese tourists was largely a mirage in
2008 and most of 2009. Tourists were far fewer than prom-
ised and arrived mostly in low-budget tour groups. Numbers
for 2010 seem to have finally picked up, and the real eco-
nomic impact can be better assessed after a few years. Un-
less their numbers grow exponentially, however, Chinese
tourists won’t be a major source of revenue for Taiwan, as
economists warned from the outset.
Other economic agreements are also clearly directed at big
industrial enterprises and financial companies long eager for
a larger footprint in China, either for cost reduction or to
enter the Chinese market, or both. As two decades of cross-
strait economic relations have shown, however, this develop-
ment has been more beneficial to businessmen, company
management, and high-level white-collar workers than to the
rest of the population. The continuing flight of Taiwanese in-
dustry to the other side of the strait has fully or partially re-
located entire sectors of the economy (footwear, toys,
leatherwear, electric appliances, small electronics, ceramics,
textiles, computers), leaving only in the island the manufac-
turing of higher-cost and more sophisticated products, and
leading to higher unemployment with strong downward pres-
sure on salaries. (31) Now the risk is that both traditional and
high-tech industries will increasingly relocate their produc-
tion to China, either as an export base (to the rest of the
world or to Taiwan) or to increase their presence on the Chi-
nese market. Recent statistics tend to confirm this trend. In
the first half of 2010, the economy showed clear signs of re-
covery following an upsurge in exports, which are closing in
on their highest pre-recession 2008 levels. (32) While the
share of Taiwan’s China-bound exports keeps rising and
reached its highest level ever in April 2010 at 44.2 percent
of total exports, half of Taiwanese exports to China are in
fact semi-finished goods that are processed and assembled
there, mostly in Taiwanese-owned factories, for re-export to
developed markets. (33) Indeed, the structure of Taiwanese ex-
port orders shows that the proportion of orders for products
made by Taiwanese-owned factories in China continues to
increase compared with those made in Taiwan, leading to
higher revenues for Taiwanese businesses but little benefit to
Taiwanese workers. (34)
All these issues were central to the debate over ECFA,
which turned rapidly into a political contest between the
KMT and the DPP, since the ECFA combines the best
hopes and worst worries about economic integration and po-
litical rapprochement with China. Unable until now to
demonstrate the concrete benefits of closer ties with China,
Ma’s administration is putting all its efforts into the ECFA,
which it presents as the only way for Taiwan’s emergence
from economic “isolation” and irrelevance. According to the
government, the ECFA is a limited, non-political trade and
investment liberalisation agreement framework that aims for
cross-strait tariff reduction, investment guarantees, and pro-
tection of intellectual property rights. Its goal is to increase
access to the Chinese market for Taiwanese industries and
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28. Hsiang-Yi Chang, “What’s Fueling Taiwan’s Land Price Explosion,” CommonWealth
Magazine, no. 445, 29 April 2010.
29. “Taiwanese Products Lose Market Share in China in 2009: MOEA,” Central News
Agency, 30 January 2010.
30. In a 2009 poll, 61.6 percent of respondents said they have never been to China, and
10.1 percent only once, while 12.7 percent of respondents have been there more than
five times; cf. “Survey Topic: People’s Views on the Chinese Mainland,” Want Daily, 11
August 2009, http://www.kmt.org.tw/english/page.aspx?type=article&mnum=114&
anum=6703.
31. Cf. T. J. Cheng, “China-Taiwan Economic Linkage: Between Insulation and
Superconductivity,” in Nancy Tucker (ed.), Dangerous Straits: The U.S.-Taiwan-China
Crisis, New York, Columbia University Press, 2005, pp. 93-130.
32. CEPD, Taiwan’s Economic Situation and Outlook, June 2010, http://www.cepd.gov.tw/
encontent/.
33. “Record High Percentage of Taiwan’s Exports Sent to China in April,” Central News
Agency, 7 May 2010; Jonathan Adams, “Weighing the Costs in Asian Trade Talks,” New
York Times, 12 May 2010.
34. “March Export Orders Hit All-Time High,” United Daily News, 21 April 2010.
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services targeted in an “early harvest” list (mainly in the
petrochemical, machinery, auto parts, transportation equip-
ment, and financial sectors), (35) to protect Taiwan’s economy
from the impact of the ASEAN-China FTA that kicked off
in 2010 and a future ASEAN+3 (China, Korea, Japan) ex-
pected to be in operation by 2011 or 2012, and to help Tai-
wan sign further FTAs with countries now reluctant to indis-
pose China by entering into trade agreements with the is-
land. The KMT also promised to help sectors of the econ-
omy likely to be threatened by the opening of Taiwan to
cheaper Chinese products, establishing a 10-year NT$95
billion (US$3 billion) industry-upgrade and welfare fund,
with assurances that no additional Chinese agricultural prod-
ucts will be granted access to the island.
The DPP has criticised several aspects of the ECFA. First
it denounced the dearth of detailed information about the
agreement and the lack of transparency in the negotiations.
Secondly, it opposes the over-reliance of Taiwan’s economy
on the PRC that an ECFA will induce, when Taiwan is al-
ready the most economically integrated country with China,
and it criticises a hidden unificationist political agenda be-
hind the ECFA. The DPP also denounces the ECFA as
benefiting only big business while threatening SMEs and
opening the door to more Chinese imports and more indus-
trial outflow to China, combining to create even greater in-
come disparity, unemployment, and social inequality in Tai-
wan. Critics of the agreement underline that the across-the-
board rise of Taiwanese exports in the first half of 2010
shows that Taiwan does not need the ECFA to increase its
exports to China and the rest of the world, and that contrary
to the government gloom-and-doom predictions, Taiwan is
largely impervious to the ASEAN-China FTA, as Taiwan
products don’t directly compete with ASEAN merchandises
in China, or with Chinese products in the ASEAN. They
also point to the fact that under WTO rules, such a free-
trade framework must lead within 10 years to the abolition
of tariffs on more than 90 percent of the trade items be-
tween the two sides. (36) The Green camp thus called for
holding a referendum on the EFCA on top of full legislative
oversight of the agreement, in contrast to previous cursory
and automatic LY approval of cross-strait agreements. 
While the administration has been at pains to counter these
critics and has acknowledged that the ECFA would create
both winners and losers (essentially among traditional indus-
tries and SMEs), it rejects the need for a referendum and
has assured critics that parliament would have the power and
opportunity to review and discuss the finalised agreement.
After more than a year of intense promotion of the EFCA
by the administration, and a TV debate on the subject be-
tween Ma Ying-jeou and DPP chairman Tsai Ing-wen in
April 2010, polls showed that most Taiwanese did not know
or understand its content and that there was no clear major-
ity supporting or opposing the agreement. (37) Even after its
signing, an independent poll showed that only 47 percent of
the Taiwanese support the agreement, (38) but a majority of
people supports holding a referendum on ECFA, even
among the Blue camp. (39) After two referendum proposals
were rejected on obscure technicalities by the government’s
Referendum Review Committee in June and August, the
Green camp is planning to submit a new proposal this fall. (40)
The ECFA was passed by the parliament on 17 August 2010
under the government’s favoured wholesale approval instead
of an article-by-article vote as requested by the DPP. (41) The
agreement is set to go into effect in September 2010, with
tariff cuts starting in January 2011. No real economic impact
is expected in 2010, and the overall benefits of the agreement
are difficult to assess as yet. Research on other FTAs and tar-
iff agreements have shown that all tend to benefit low-cost in-
dustries in developing countries and economic elites on all
sides, while the lower and middle classes of developed coun-
tries suffer the most, and the wealth gap increases. (42) At the
same time, if signing the ECFA reduces Beijing’s political
opposition to more Taiwanese international trade agree-
ments, and leads to more FTAs between Taiwan and its re-
gional economic partners, the EU, and, especially, the US,
as promised by Ma’s government, the ECFA could be seen
as a useful tool for advancing Taiwan’s international eco-
nomic and political interests.
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35. For the full text of the ECFA agreement, cf. MAC website, www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=
85781&ctNode =6727&mp=1; for an analysis of the “early harvest” list and its negoti-
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China Leadership Monitor, no. 33, Summer 2010.
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Press, 2010.
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Pacts,” South China Morning Post, 7 July 2010.
42. “Bracing for Uneven Distribution of Wealth,” Commercial Times, 3 May 2010; R. Scott,
C. Salas, and B. Campbell, Revisiting NAFTA: Still Not Working for North America’s
Workers, Economic Policy institute, Briefing Paper 173, 28 September 2006. For the
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On the political side, however, an internal report released in
July by the Budget Centre and the Legal affairs research Bu-
reau of Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan tends to give credence to
the main worries of the opposition by emphasising serious
economic and security weaknesses in the ECFA that could
lead to an “economic siege’’ and threaten Taiwan’s sover-
eignty. (43) Confirming the political nature of the ECFA, at
least for Beijing, the report highlights the agreement as a key
element in China’s attempt to achieve unification with Tai-
wan, and states that Beijing intends to use it as a leverage to
increase Taiwan economic dependence on China and apply
pressure for political talks on unification.
Administrative  per fo rmance  and pub licapprai sa l  
Halfway through his mandate, Ma’s inability to deliver on
his promises of a quick and strong economic revival, and the
realisation by all, including Ma, that his 6-3-3 program is
only a distant dream, are eating into Ma’s approval and trust
rates. His policies of rapprochement with China have also
aroused strong opposition within the Green camp and
among swing voters. But other important missteps by the
president and his government have added to their negative
public image and explain their low popularity. Discontent is
widespread and not limited to the opposition, with blunt crit-
icism and scathing editorials coming from within the KMT
and the pro-Blue media.
The first target of public criticism was a series of crises and
their mismanagement by the government since 2008, which
unveiled a mixture of incompetence, arrogance, and careless-
ness among the higher authorities. The debacle of the Ma
government’s response to the August 2009 Morakot Ty-
phoon and subsequent flooding (the worst in Taiwan in the
past 60 years and leading to more than 600 casualties) was
the most egregious example of the administration’s inability
to react promptly and efficiently to a serious challenge. The
crisis was aggravated by the government’s apparent lack of
concern for the people’s problems and opinions, a reluctance
to accept international help, and a tendency to evade respon-
sibility for its actions while blaming others for its shortcom-
ings. The government’s botched response to some less
deadly typhoons and to the scandal of melamine-laced milk
from China in the summer of 2008, as well as the full-blown
fiasco in the fall of 2009 surrounding the re-authorisation of
US beef imports without regard for a past legislative resolu-
tion and public concern, are other missteps that have under-
mined public confidence in the government. The aftermath
of the Morakot typhoon forced the resignation of the tech-
nocratic Prime Minister Liu Chao-hsuan and a major reshuf-
fle of the cabinet, which is now led by the more down-to-
earth KMT politician Wu Den-yih. Since then, a series of
administrative blunders, contested policies, policy flip-flops,
and general disappointment with the KMT administration’s
performance have kept  its public credibility and confidence
levels low.
Other reasons for public disappointment include Ma’s fail-
ure to fulfil his promise of national reconciliation within Tai-
wan. Instead of reaching out to the opposition and trying to
develop consensus on economic and social policies or on
China and international policies, Ma and his administration
have been largely deaf to criticism or suggestion, feeding Tai-
wan’s political polarisation and rejecting Green camp mem-
bers who, after their crushing defeat, would probably have
been prepared to discuss national policies. (44) Worse, the Ma
administration has been involved in what can only be called
a campaign of witch-hunting and revenge against many for-
mer DPP government officials through the use of prosecuto-
rial and judicial power against alleged corruption, leading to
serious concern among outside observers and judicial ex-
perts regarding the behaviour of Taiwan’s judicial officials
and the political use of justice under the KMT. (45) Former
President Chen Shui-bian’s trial saga resulted in a sentence
of life in prison for corruption (reduced to 20 years on ap-
peal in June 2010) without proof linking him directly to the
financial malversations of his entourage, and when the al-
leged misuse or concealment of political donations were the
rules of the game in the legal grey area of Taiwanese politi-
cal financing. (46) The trial was also marred by a series of du-
bious actions and decisions by the prosecutors and the judi-
cial system in regards to defence rights and the right to a fair
trial. (47) While the general public believes in some degree of
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43. Cf. Martin Williams, “Taiwan Legislative Report Warns of Danger in China Trade Deal,”
Kyodo, 28 July 2010; Flora Wang, “Report from Legislative Agency Details the Cross-
strait Political Risk of ECFA,” Taipei Times, 29 July 2010. The report is partly based on a
May 2010 fact-finding trip and analysis of the China-Hong Kong CEPA free-trade agree-
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June, the opposition accused the KMT of blocking release of the evaluation report to
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44. Julian Baum, “Who’s Listening to Taiwan’s People?,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 6
November 2009.
45. “Open Letter on Erosion of Justice in Taiwan,” Taipei Times, 6 November 2008; Jerome
A. Cohen, “Silence of the Lambs: Taiwan’s Top Minds Need to Speak Out on Law
Reforms to Help Achieve the Best Democratic Solutions,” South China Morning Post, 11
June 2009.
46. Jonathan Manthorpe, “Evidence Fails to Support Life Sentence for Taiwan’s Former
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culpability by Chen Shui-bian, the way his case and other
prosecutions of DPP politicians and former officials were
handled by the Ma administration has done a great disservice
to Taiwan’s society and democracy, and shows how far reform
of the judicial system has to go before it reaches the standard
shared by more mature democracies. (48) Meanwhile, bills
pending in the Ministry of Justice that threaten basic defence
and lawyer rights have raised alarm bells within the legal,
scholarly, and justice-monitoring communities. (49)
Another main concern regarding the administration touches
on public and media freedom and overzealous police behav-
iour. The repressive actions of the police administration be-
fore, during, and after public demonstrations or private gath-
erings criticising the president or the government policies
since 2008 – and especially during the demonstrations
against the second Chiang-Chen meeting in Taipei in No-
vember 2008 – the false reform of the Assembly and Pa-
rade Act still used by prosecutors against political and civil
rights demonstrators, and other new freedom-restricting
laws have angered not only the political opposition but most
democratic activists and scholars. (50) In all these cases, bad
habits of control and intimidation reminiscent of KMT au-
thoritarian rule have made people wonder whether the free-
dom and democracy they enjoyed during the Chen years is
in danger. (51) On the media front, international press free-
dom watchdogs have condemned repeated attempts by the
Ma administration to politically control and rein in state-
owned media (TV stations, Central News Agency) to sup-
port government policies instead of fostering the balanced
and critical reporting and analysis that is the duty of free
journalism. (52) The purchase of the formerly KMT-con-
trolled China Times media group (including its TV sta-
tions) by the China-based and pro-China Taiwanese busi-
nessman Tsai Eng-meng has also led to worries that the
media industry, already largely in the KMT camp, could fall
under the influence of Beijing-linked groups, and that Tai-
wan’s press freedom could deteriorate to the point where
self-censorship à la Hong Kong or Singapore and self-con-
gratulating propaganda by powerful pro-government media
could undermine the free and public exchange of political
and social ideas. (53) As a result, the US-based Freedom
House has warned for two years in a row of a decline in
press freedom in Taiwan, which has dropped 14 places to
the 47th rank in the world, and from first to eighth in Asia
since 2008. (54)
All this discontent has been reflected in numerous opinion
polls by various survey centres, including pro-KMT media
such as the United Daily News, China Times, TVBS,
and Global Views Magazine, which show a steady decline
in support for Ma and his administration. According to
Global Views polls, Ma Ying-jeou’s approval rating fell al-
most as soon as he was inaugurated, with disapproval
jumping to 46.2 percent in June 2008 against 11.9 percent
the previous month and exceeding his 37.8 percent ap-
proval score. In the past two years, his approval rate re-
mained below 40 percent, and since the Morakot typhoon
in August 2009 has hovered between 20 and 30 percent
(28.4 percent in June 2010) against a disapproval rate of
around 60 percent. The high level of trust with which Ma
entered office at 55.4 percent also dwindled to a low of
38.3 percent in June 2010, with distrust numbers around
43 percent. (55) This shows that dissatisfaction for Ma is
felt across the board, among the Blue camp and swing vot-
ers as well as in the opposition Green camp. It also indi-
cates that the crisis of confidence that faces his govern-
ment is fed not only by economic problems, but also by
opposition to his vigorous pro-China policies and disap-
pointment with his administration’s performance. Reg iona l  e l ec t i ons  and  domes-t i c  po l i t i c a l  compe t i t ion  
Not surprisingly, this general dissatisfaction has spilled
over into various local elections since 2008. We will first
focus on the December 2009 regional elections, and then
look into the 10 by-elections held over the last two years
to see how the fortunes of the KMT and DPP have
changed.
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The December  2009 regional  e lec t ions
The 16th regional elections for city and county chiefs took
place on 5 December 2009 in conjunction with elections for
city and county councils and township chiefs in a three-in-
one format first used in 2005. However, only 17 of the 23
cities and counties in play in 2005 were involved this time,
following the government’s July 2009 decision to merge and
upgrade some cities and counties to the “special municipal-
ity” administrative level previously enjoyed only by Taipei
and Kaohsiung. As a result, Taiwan now has five special mu-
nicipalities holding elections for mayors and councillors in
November 2010: Taipei City, the new Sinbei City (formerly
Taipei County), and the new Taichung, Tainan, and Kaoh-
siung Cities created by the merging of the former cities and
counties of the same names. The electorate of the remain-
ing 17 cities and counties represents only around 40 percent
of Taiwan’s population. The December 2009 elections were
nonetheless politically significant on two counts. First, they
provided some indications of the respective strength of the
two main political parties and their ability to mobilise their
partisans and local networks, especially the KMT, whose
electoral machine is particularly strong in local elections.
Secondly, although local in nature, they were also the first
large-scale and country-wide electoral test faced by both the
new KMT administration and a DPP being revamped
under Tsai Ing-wen’s leadership. (56)
The outcome of the elections was an important symbolic
success for the DPP and a relative setback for the KMT
(see Table 1). Of the 14 cities and counties formerly held
by the KMT, one went to the DPP and one to a KMT-dis-
sident independent candidate. While the KMT still won the
large majority of seats, the vote numbers and percentages in-
dicated significant progress by the DPP. Compared to the
2005 results (in the same 17 districts), the DPP-led Green
camp increased its vote total by 5.82 percent to 45.32 per-
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 % Votes Seats  % Votes Seats % Votes Seats 09/05 % Change
09/05 Votes 
Change 
Registered Voters 12,835,467 23 13,645,079 23 7,051,039 17
Turnout 66.45 8,529,647 66.22 9,035,144 63.34 4,466,403
Invalid Votes 135,543 158,002 91,471
2009 Districts (valid votes) 4,156,931 4,467,939 4,374,932 -93,007
KMT 35.1 2,950,217 9 51.17 4,523,775 14 47.88 2,094,518 12
PFP 2.4 197,707 2 1.11 98,964 1
NP 9.9 834,956 1 0.2 17,359 1
Blue Camp 47.4 3,982,880 12 52.48 4,640,098 16 47.88 2,094,518 12 -4.6
2009 Districts KMT 45.25 1,881,051 7 49.8 2,225,075 11 47.88 2,094,518 12 -1.92
2009 Districts Blue Camp 50.35 2,092,906 10 52.18 2,331,337 13 47.88 2,094,518 12 -4.3 -236,819
DPP 45.3 3,799,709 9 42.13 3,724,290 6 45.32 1,982,518 4
TSU 1.13 100,243
Green Camp 45.3 3,799,709 9 43.26 3,824,533 6 45.32 1,982,914 4 2.06
2009 Districts DPP 41.96 1,744,462 5 38.19 1,706,491 3 45.32 1,982,914 4 7.13
2009 Districts Green Camp 41.96 1,744,462 5 39.5 1,764,734 3 45.32 1,982,914 4 5.82 218,180
Independents 7.3 610,216 2 4.65 412,511 1* 6.8 297,500 1 2.15
2009 Districts Independent 7.69 319,563 2 8.32 371,868 1 6.8 297,500 1 -1.52 -74,368
2001 Regional Elections 2005 Regional Elections 2009 Regional Elections
Blue Camp Green Camp Independent
Table 1. Taiwan 2001-2009 Regional Elections Overall Result (with comparisons for 2009 17 districts)
* Elected as an independent candidate, the Taitung County Chief rejoined the KMT after her victory.
Table: Frank Muyard. Source: Central Election Commission
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cent, while the KMT-led Blue camp declined by 4.3 percent
to 47.88 percent, and the independent vote share dropped
1.52 percent to 6.8 percent. This represents the best results
ever for the DPP in regional elections in these districts,
while the KMT faced its worst run since 1997 (when a high
number of KMT dissident candidates skewed the results and
caused the loss of many seats to the DPP). The difference
between the two camps has narrowed to only 2.5 percent, a
clear success for the Green camp, even if most of the inde-
pendent votes may be considered pro-Blue. Compared to the
2008 presidential elections in the same districts, the DPP’s
vote share also increased by 5.8 percent, while the KMT’s
share plunged 12.63 percent from the 61 percent earned by
Ma Ying-jeou. 
Analysis of the vote numbers shows the same trends. With
a lower turnout and 93,000 fewer valid votes than in 2005,
the DPP won more than 218,000 additional votes and the
KMT lost more than 236,000 votes, falling back to the level
of the whole Blue camp in 2001, while the independents lost
74,000 votes. Perhaps of even greater significance for future
elections is the across-the-board increase in DPP votes in
traditionally Blue camp regions (see Table 2). Counties that
were considered sure bets for the KMT, such as Taoyuan,
Taitung, and Penghu, were more contested than expected,
with significant progress also recorded in Keelung and
Hsinchu City. Meanwhile, DPP incumbents in Yunlin and
Pingtung were re-elected with overwhelming majorities ex-
ceeding 60 percent and double-digit increases compared to
2005. The combination of lower turnout and DPP progress
shows that the KMT failed to mobilise its base while a sig-
nificant portion of swing-votes went to the DPP. Also sym-
bolically important was the return of long-time Tangwai and
DPP-run Ilan County to the DPP fold after four years of
KMT administration. Similarly, the loss of strong Blue
Hualien County to a former PFP legislator who ran as an
independent after being rejected for the KMT nomination
over judicial liabilities is a clear personal defeat for the pres-
ident, who publicly opposed him. (57)
On the whole, the DPP also performed better in these elec-
tions than in the 23-city and county elections in 2005
(+2.06 percent). Moreover, the fact that in 2005 the DPP’s
overall result in the 23 districts was 3.76 percent higher than
its results in the 17 districts (in play in 2009) indicates that
its vote base is much higher in the 6 districts now merged
into or upgraded to special municipalities. One reason is the
more rural tint of the 17 districts compared with the more ur-
banised Taipei, Taichung, Tainan, and Kaohsiung metropol-
itan areas where the DPP usually scores better, as well as
the weight of the southern region of Tainan and Kaohsiung
where support for the Green camp is traditionally higher. It
is therefore possible that the DPP would have won in terms
of vote shares if the regional election had been held in all of
the former 23 districts. 
Without extrapolating too much on the national significance
of such local elections, the December poll results constitute
a strong warning message from the electorate to the KMT
administration about the way it is ruling the country. The
KMT acknowledged this while rejecting any change of ori-
entation in its policies other than improving communication
about its work and attending closer to voter needs and inter-
ests. The subsequent by-elections indicated that this re-
sponse failed to change voters’ opinions of the ruling party
and its government. The DPP for its part regarded the re-
sults with cautious optimism as an encouraging but limited
success and a welcome boost to confidence following the
doldrums of the 2008 defeat. Finally, one must note that the
elections were marred by widespread vote-buying, especially
by KMT candidates, leading the media to call it one of the
dirtiest elections in history, and making the anti-corruption
slogans of Ma Ying-jeou sound hollow if not downright 
hypocritical. (58)
2009 and 2010 legis la tive  by -e lec t ions
Ten legislative by-elections have been held since 2008, five
of them after judicial rulings invalidated the initial polls on
the grounds of the vote-buying or ineligibility of KMT can-
didates (three in 2009: Miaoli, Taipei’s Da-an, Yunlin; two
in 2010: Taichung County, Taoyuan), and five others to re-
place legislators elected as city or county chiefs in Decem-
ber 2009 (Chiayi County, Hsinchu County, Hualien,
Taitung, Taoyuan). Of those 10 elections, the DPP won
seven, including six held in January and February 2010, for
a total gain of six seats, confirming its performance in the
December regional elections. The DPP candidates beat
their KMT opponents not only in pro-Green Chiayi and
Yunlin, but also in the two by-elections in Taoyuan, as well
as in Taichung, Hsinchu, and Taitung, all counties more
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57. For the two other local polls held on December 5, results showed a classic domination
by the KMT and independents, although the DPP also increased the numbers of its elect-
ed officials. In the election for city and county councils, the KMT received 43.94 percent
of the votes, the DPP 24.41 percent, and the independents and other parties 31.65 per-
cent. In the township mayoral elections, the KMT won 121 posts (with 48.82 percent of
the votes), the DPP 34 posts (with 20.04 percent), and the independents 56 posts (with
31.14 percent). Source: Central Election Commission.
58. “A Travesty of Democracy,” China Post, 7 December 2009; Peter Harmsen, “Vote-buy-
ing Taints Taiwan’s Democracy: Analysts,” Agence France-Presse, 2 December 2009.
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Districts
Registered
Voters /
Turnout % 
Registered
Voters /
Turnout % 
KMT (Blue) 
votes / % / 
2009/2005 %
Change 
DPP (Green)
votes / % / 
2009/2005 %
Change 
KMT
(Blue camp)
votes / % 
DPP
(Green camp)
votes / % 
Independent
votes / % 
Independent
votes / % 
Total
(2009 17 Districts)
2,331,337 1,764,734 371,868 7,051,039 2,094,518 1,982,518 297,500
52.18 39.5 8.32 63.34 47.88 45.32 6.8
-4.3 5.82
Ilan 340,550 121,463 112,853 2,020 351,858 112,469 133,394
70.25 51.39 47.75 0.85 70.68 45.74 54.26
-5.65 6.51
Keelung 292,330 76,162 (124,094) 2,771 (61,014) 299,960 86,001 65,673 4,391
64.05 41.14 (67.04) 1.5 (32.96) 53.04 55.11 42.08 2.81
-11.93 9.12
Taoyuan 1,319,334 488,979 307,965 6,784 1,437,190 396,237 346,678 15,807
61.77 60.84 38.32 0.84 53.73 52.22 45.69 2.08
-8.62 7.37
Hsinchu City 277,182 112,221 49,777  298,439 92,667 68,822 5,074
59.6 69.27 30.73 56.83 55.63 41.32 3.05
-13.64 10.59
Hsinchu Co. 335,906 157,012 77,037  369,480 97,151 77,126 78,147
71.12 67.09 32.91 69.49 38.49 30.55 30.96
-28.6 2.36
Miaoli 411,296 134,277 83,694 62,313 425,837 181,256 95,469 7,413
69.45 47.91 29.86 22.23 68.28 63.79 33.6 2.61
15.88 3.74
Changhua 961,048 370,790 270,949 26,887 991,741 348,341 276,897 9,402
71.16 55.46 40.52 4.02 65.56 54.89 43.63 1.48
-0.57 3.11
Nantou 398,903 124,777 83,503 67,064 408,006 136,951 107,023 25,243
70.48 45.32 30.33 24.36 67.75 50.87 39.75 9.37
 5.55 15.39
Yunlin 553,486 167,690 201,192 8,125 560,207 121,832 229,958
69.73 44.48 53.37 2.16 64.61 34.63 65.37
-9.85 12
Chiayi City 196,054 74,786 62,122 202,581 69,962 61,268 2,801
70.77 54.63 45.37 66.96 52.2 45.71 2.09
-2.43 0.34
Chiayi County 422,387 109,192 183,476 428,673 128,973 177,333 10,829
71.64 37.31 62.69 75.29 40.67 55.92 3.42
3.36 -6.77
Pingtung 672,781 195,928 216,200 55,980 682,475 185,384 270,402
70.68 41.86 46.19 11.96 68.09 40.67 59.33
-1.19 13.14
Hualien 258,736 66,575 (104,954) 30,988 20,113 261,214 38,603  113,127 (85,532)
61.6 42.66 (67.25) 19.86 12.89 59.47 25.44  74.56 (56.37)
-41.81 43.48
Taitung 178,785   105,080 (62,189) 178,139 56,354 50,802
60.51   100 (59.18) 61.88 52.59 47.41
Penghu 70,427 25,223 23,964 572 75,033 22,664 22,069 1.177
72.16 50.69 48.16 1.15 63.33 49.37 48.07 2.56
-1.32 -0.09
Kinmen 52,039 (17,359)  14,622 72,509 14,269  24,011
62.78 (54.28)  45.72 53.8 37.28  62,72
 
Lienchiang 8,170 (2,592)  2,308 7,697 3,135 (5,404)  78
60.99 (52.9)  47.1 72.25 57.19 (98.58)  1.42
Blue Camp Green Camp Independent
2009 Regional Elections2005 Regional Elections
Table 2. Taiwan 2005 and 2009 Regional Elections Results by Districts (2009 Elections's 17 cities and counties only)
Winners in bold type and red, light red, or black according to political affiliation. 2005/2009 percentage change for Blue and Green camps only.
Table: Frank Muyard. Source: Central Election Commission
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favourable to the Blue-camp. Meanwhile the Miaoli by-elec-
tion was won by a DPP-supported KMT dissident candi-
date, leaving only two lukewarm victories for the KMT in
the Blue bastions of Taipei’s Da-an district and Hualien.
As a result, the KMT’s majority in the Legislative Yuan de-
creased from 81 to 74 seats, while the number of DPP leg-
islators rose from 27 to 33. With its independent allies, the
KMT still controls up to 78 seats, (59) a comfortable majority
that enables it to pass any legislation it wishes, at least when
bad communication between the KMT government and the
KMT legislative caucus does not hinder the approval of ad-
ministration policies and budgets as during the US beef au-
thorisation fiasco and other cases of disagreement between
the two branches of government in the past two years.
The DPP resurgence
Along with Ma’s declining popularity, the political landscape
of the past two years has been marked by a gradual resur-
gence of the DPP as attested by its recent electoral suc-
cesses. This has been fuelled by the electorate’s disappoint-
ment with the KMT and the DPP’s changing leadership
and discourse. Since the crushing electoral defeats of 2008,
the DPP has embarked on a double policy of reform and re-
building to consolidate core support and expand into the cru-
cial swing voter segment of the population. The new direc-
tion under Tsai Ing-wen’s chairmanship has gradually disso-
ciated the party from Chen Shui-bian and the corruption
scandals surrounding his family while still defending the
achievements of the DPP’s eight-year administration in
terms of economic growth, promotion of Taiwan’s sover-
eignty and identity, and social policies. In doing so, the party
has been careful not to be seen as letting down the former
president, who still commands sympathy and support among
deep-Green partisans who see his prosecution as a political
vendetta by the KMT. At the same time, the new leadership
has attempted to make the party more policy-oriented, with
technical expertise and competence in devising policies ben-
eficial to the whole population, especially the middle and
working classes. It also promotes the records of city and
county governments under DPP rule to bolster the image of
a party close to the population and with good administrative
governance. This has worked well with Tsai Ing-wen’s aca-
demic background and expert image and has helped mitigate
the radical image too often associated with the DPP under
Chen Shui-bian. Occasional clashes during street demon-
strations and brawls in the Legislative Yuan still hinder a
wholesale revamping of the party image. But they also attest
to the intense frustration and anger felt by Green camp sup-
porters regarding the direction the country is taking and their
feeling of powerlessness in influencing its course. Following
its recent election successes, the DPP is in better shape in
terms of unity and self-confidence. Opinion polls also show
that since November 2009, Tsai Ing-wen has enjoyed a
higher approval rating than Ma Ying-jeou, (60) and the party
will also certainly continue to benefit from any mistakes and
failures by the government and the KMT. But winning fu-
ture national elections will require reshaping itself into a
party more focused on bread-and-butter issues and proposing
clear and (maybe more) pragmatic policies regarding Tai-
wan’s relations with China and the issue of independence to
attract greater support from middle-of-the-road voters. 
The next major electoral test will be on 27 November 2010
with the election of mayors and city councils in the five spe-
cial municipalities. The DPP can count on the achievements
of its local magistrates in the former Kaohsiung and Tainan
cities and counties, which coupled with traditional higher
support in the south will put the party in the driver’s seat for
these two new southern municipalities if it can avoid internal
divisions. The battle for Taipei, Sinbei, and Taichung spe-
cial municipalities, in more Blue-leaning regions, will depend
on the quality of the DPP and KMT candidates, the inter-
nal unity of the two camps, and the overall record of the
local and central KMT governments. (61) For the KMT, vic-
tory in these three municipalities is essential to show that it
can end its decline and put itself in position for the 2012
elections.
There is still a long way to go before the 2012 legislative and
presidential elections, and many things can happen in the
volatile Taiwanese political climate. The main change, how-
ever, is that Ma Ying-jeou’s re-election is no longer assured.
Spring 2010 polls indicated that Ma could loose the election
in the case of a Su Tseng-chang candidacy. (62) In 2008, a
second-term was considered a sure bet by both the KMT
and the opposition. That this is no longer the case demon-
strates how much the KMT and Ma Ying-jeou’s policies and
performance have disappointed the population. The 2012
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59. In July 2010, another Blue camp legislator and sole PFP representative (representing the
“Plains aborigines”) had his election annulled for vote buying.
60. Cf. Global Views Survey Research Center, “Taiwan Public Mood Index June 2010,” 25
June 2010.
61. By June 2010, all the candidates were chosen. They are: in Taipei, Hau Lung-bin (KMT)
vs. Su Tseng-chang (DPP); in Sinbei, Eric Chu Li-luan (KMT) vs. Tsai Ing-wen (DPP); in
Taichung, Jason Hu Chih-chiang (KMT) vs. Su Jia-chyuan (DPP); in Tainan, Kuo Tien-tsai
(KMT) vs. William Lai Ching-te (DPP); and in Kaohsiung, Huang Chao-shun (KMT) vs.
Chen Chu (DPP).
62. “Public Opinion Poll. Survey Topic: 2012 Presidential Election,” United Daily News, 19
March 2010, http://udn.com/NEWS/NATIONAL/NAT1/5484850.shtml.
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election is still Ma’s to lose, as he will have the advantages
of incumbency and government and KMT networks, money,
and media power. Even so, his re-election will depend on
marked improvement to the economy and evidence that the
administration is noting and addressing public concerns and
needs. Ma may also have to tread more cautiously on the is-
sues of relations with China and Taiwan’s sovereignty in ac-
knowledgement of a growing gap between his administration
and the rest of the population in terms of national identity.Ma Ying- jeou and Taiwan’s  national  ident ity
Ma was not elected on a Chinese reunification or Chinese
nationalist program. On the contrary, he launched a cam-
paign centred on his own Taiwanese identity, the defence of
Taiwan’s sovereignty as the Republic of China, and his com-
mitment that Taiwan’s future must be decided only by the 23
million Taiwanese. (63) What is worrisome for many Tai-
wanese, over and above the 41.5 percent who voted against
Ma, is the disappearance of Ma’s Taiwan-centred discourse
and its replacement by a Chinese nationalist discourse focus-
ing on the Republic of China and the great Chinese ethnic-
ity/nation (Zhonghua minzu). A new awareness of Ma’s
personal Chinese nationalism is also attested in polls of pub-
lic perceptions of Ma’s stance on the unification-independ-
ence issue. (64) While August 2005 found 46.9 percent of the
respondents believing that Ma’s stance was to keep the sta-
tus quo, against 24 percent who believed he was leaning to-
wards unification, in October 2009 only 30.1 percent still
believed that Ma supported the status quo option in the long
term, against 45.1 percent who thought he favoured unifica-
tion. 
A major problem with Ma’s pro-Chinese rhetoric, apart from
its shift away from his election discourse, is that it goes
against the evolving Taiwanese identity and the public per-
ception of China. Opinion polls results even seem to indi-
cate that the more the KMT government leans toward
China and cosies up to PRC officials, and the more the Tai-
wanese meet Chinese people, the greater the public identi-
fies as Taiwanese and as different from the Chinese. After
the return to power of the KMT in 2008, some in Taiwan
and abroad expected the rise of Taiwanese national identity
and nationalism to stop or recede. This was especially the
case among those who attributed these phenomena mainly
to political manipulation by the former administrations of
Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. Others believed that
under a new pro-China government, growing economic inte-
gration between Taiwan and China would morph into the
rise of a “common” Chinese identity and a desire for politi-
cal unification among the Taiwanese. All surveys since 2008
indicate that this is not the case, however, and that Tai-
wanese identity and opposition to unification have reached
their highest level ever under Ma’s rule, especially among
the young generation. 
According to the NCCU Election Survey Center’s polls,
the number of respondents identifying as Taiwanese in De-
cember 2007 was 43.7 percent, against 44.5 percent who
perceived themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese and
5.4 percent as Chinese. (65) In June 2008, it was respectively
46.1 percent against 45.4 percent and 3.4 percent. In June
2010, 52.4 percent of the respondents said they were Tai-
wanese – a jump of 6.3 percent in two years – against 40.4
percent with dual identity and only 3.8 percent Chinese.
The steady rise in the number of Taiwanese identifiers at
the expense of both Chinese identity and dual identity con-
tinued, therefore, even after Ma’s 2008 victory, leading the
Taiwanese identity group to constitute the majority of re-
spondents since December 2008, and to register the highest
score ever for any category in June 2010. Concurrent polls
by the Blue-leaning TVBS media group confirm this trend,
and show that when asked to choose between only two op-
tions, 72 percent of the respondents identified as Taiwanese
against 16 percent as Chinese in March 2009, a rise of 4
percent and a decline of 2 percent, respectively, since June
2008. (66) A more recent comprehensive poll by Common-
Wealth Magazine also indicates that in December 2009, 62
percent of respondents said they were Taiwanese, against 22
percent as both Taiwanese and Chinese, and 8 percent as
Chinese. (67) The trend is even more accentuated among the
young: 75 percent in the 18-29 age group perceive them-
selves as Taiwanese, against 14 percent as Taiwanese and
Chinese and 7 percent as Chinese.
On the independence/unification issue, polls also show a
clear trend against unification and in favour of separateness
if not outright Taiwanese independence. While the status
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63. Cf. F. Muyard, “Taiwan Elections 2008,” op. cit.; Daniel Lynch, “Mr. Ma’s Taiwanese
Identity,” Far Eastern Economic Review, vol. 171, no. 2, March 2008.
64. Cf. Global Views Survey Research Center, “Survey on President Ma Ying-jeou’s
Performance after Assuming KMT Chairpersonship etc.” 22 October 2009, www.tai-
wansecurity.org/2009/GVMaApproval _Independence-102209.pdf.
65. Cf. “Important Political Attitude Trend Distribution,” June 2010, Election Study Center,
National Chengchi University, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/
index.php?id=6.
66. Cf. TVBS Public Opinion Poll, 12 March 2009.
67. Cf. “2010 State of the Nation Survey,” CommonWealth Magazine, no. 437, 15 December
2009. http://english. cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=11589.
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quo option always wins the greatest support in all polls,
when asked more specifically about a choice between inde-
pendence and unification, respondents are overwhelmingly
in favour of the former. TVBS polls show that in December
2009, 68 percent of Taiwanese supported independence
against 13 percent for unification, with 19 percent express-
ing no opinion. This marked a rise of 13 percent for inde-
pendence and a decline of 12 percent for unification since
March 2007. (68) Another series of polls by Global Views
Magazine indicates that in July 2010, 66.1 percent of Tai-
wanese opposed unification with China even if the two sides
had a similar level of political and economic development,
against 12.1 percent who agreed to it. (69) The rejection of
unification is therefore based on more than a preference for
democracy and free society against dictatorship. It also
clearly reflects a perception of two different societies and the
desire to maintain a separate country from China.
As a whole, Taiwanese have a rather pragmatic and busi-
ness-like attitude towards China. In 2009, 52.3 percent con-
sidered “people on the mainland” as business partners
against 13.3 percent who saw them as friends. (70) When
asked about the reason for any future travel to China, 73.2
percent of Taiwanese respondents said tourism, followed by
only 14.5 percent for work or business, and 3.5 percent to
visit family and friends. Taiwanese also express increasingly
negative views of China and the Chinese. According to a
September 2009 CommonWealth poll, this is not the result
of ignorance but rather of increased contact: the more expe-
rience people have of China, the greater their scepticism or
fear of it. (71) This poll also indicates that 70 percent of Tai-
wanese have a negative opinion of Chinese tourists, while
another 70 percent fear that cross-strait exchanges may harm
Taiwan’s sovereignty, 75 percent are afraid that closer inter-
actions with China will threaten their job or livelihood, and
60 percent believe that the new cross-strait relations mostly
benefit the KMT and the CCP. This does not mean that
Taiwanese oppose cross-strait exchange relations, but they
are divided over the benefits (48 percent believing they are
largely beneficial against 43 percent who believe that nega-
tives outweigh positives), and are clearly afraid that eco-
nomic rapprochement with China and current pro-China
policies may be against their interests. 
All poll results since Ma Ying-jeou’s presidential victory in-
dicate, therefore, that the change of government has not re-
versed long-time trends in Taiwan’s national identity. As op-
posed to the KMT’s dictatorship era, since the 1990s Tai-
wanese have been free to choose and express their national
identity and have manifested an increasingly clear choice for
preserving the separation between China and the inclusive
Taiwanese society and nation most of them feel they now
share, even in the case of similar economic and political con-
ditions in the future. Since the turn of the 1990s, changes in
Taiwanese society have also followed a path that diverges
from China’s. While some thought that trade and capitalism
would bring the two societies closer, they have in fact moved
even further away from each other with Taiwan’s democrati-
sation and generational replacement. While the large number
of Taiwanese working in China has resulted in growing con-
tact between the populations of the two countries, this has
not necessarily brought Taiwanese closer to the Chinese or
involved them in the same life community. Rather, it has re-
sulted in greater awareness of the differences between the so-
cieties: lifestyle, education, behavioural habits, interpersonal
relationships, open-mindedness, appreciation of cultures and
foreign countries (especially United States and Japan), social
security and health systems, and rule of law, on top of politi-
cal freedom and democracy. Increased contact with the Chi-
nese, either in the PRC for business and tourism, or in Tai-
wan with the growing number of Chinese tourists, seems to
feed the same sense of distinctiveness that occurred when vis-
its to China were first allowed at the end of the 1980s. Ma’s
policies of rapprochement with China also appear to have
generated an even stronger desire among the Taiwanese to
assert Taiwanese identity and their desire for independence. Conclusion
In term of national identity, Ma and most of the KMT’s
other older-generation politicians, especially with Mainlan-
der backgrounds, now find themselves out of step and in a
deep disconnect with the rest of the population, native Tai-
wanese, Aborigines, and the younger Mainlander genera-
tion alike. (72) This gap is one reason for the Ma administra-
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68. TVBS Public Opinion Poll, 13 March 2009, op. cit., and TVBS Public Opinion Poll, 
17 December 2009.
69. Global Views Survey Research Center, “Survey on Signed ECFA etc.,” op. cit.
70. On the opposite side, 53.3 percent of the Chinese surveyed regarded the “people on
Taiwan” as family and relatives, and only 16.2 percent as business partners. Cf. Global
Views Research Center, “Survey on How Each Side of Taiwan Strait Views the Other,” 
1 July 2009, www.kmt.org.w/english/page/aspx?type=article&mnum=114&anum=
6489.
71. Jerry Lai, “Survey on Cross-strait Relations: Three out of Four Taiwanese Have
Sinophobia,” CommonWealth Magazine, no. 430, 10 September 2009,
http://english.cw.com.tw/article.do?action=show&id=11340.
72. According to the latest survey on Taiwan’s ethnic repartition, Mainlanders compose
around 9 percent of the overall population, Hoklo 70 percent, Hakka 14 percent,
Aborigines 2 percent and “Taiwanese” 4 percent. Cf. Council for Hakka Affairs, Executive
Yuan, “Research Report on 2008 National Research Survey on Hakka Population,”
Council for Hakka Affairs Press, December 2008, p. 71.
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tion’s problems and loss of trust among the Taiwanese. It
also shows that Ma and his administration do not understand
or are unwilling to accept Taiwan’s changing political and na-
tional identity over the past two decades. The election of
Ma Ying-jeou as president of Taiwan showed that the Tai-
wanese want to benefit more from China’s economic growth
and desire peaceful relations with China, as promised by
Ma’s campaign. At the same time, they continue to assert
their independence, their sovereignty, and their Taiwanese
national identity. The capacity of Ma and the KMT to
recognise this reality and to start representing the identity of
the majority of the population instead of denying it under a
Chinese ethnic discourse will be one of the factors in play in
the next election. Together with the country’s socio-eco-
nomic performance and the administrative competence of
his government, it will determine whether Ma can win a sec-
ond term, or if the DPP will have another shot at ruling the
country.•
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Glossary
Chen Chu 陳菊
Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁
Chen Yunlin 陳雲林
Chiang Pin-kun 江丙坤
Chiayi 嘉義
Da-an 大安
Diaoyutai / Senkaku Islands - 釣魚台群島 (Chinese) / 尖閣諸
島 (Japanese)
duideng de diqu dui diqu teshu de guanxi 對等的地區對地區特
殊的關係
Eric Chu Li-luan 朱立倫
Frank Hsieh Chang-ting 謝長廷
guozu 國族
Hau Lung-bin 郝龍斌
Hsinchu 新竹
Hualien 花蓮
Huang Chao-shun 黃昭順
Jason Hu Chih-chiang 胡志強
Kaohsiung 高雄
Keelung 基隆
Kinmen 金門
Kuo Tien-tsai 郭添財
Kuomintang 國民黨
Lee Teng-hui 李登輝
Lien Chan 連戰
Liu Chao-hsuan 劉兆玄
Matsu 馬祖
Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九
Miaoli 苗栗
minzu 民族
minzuxue 民族學
Penghu 澎湖
Pingtung 屏東
renminbi 人民幣
shaoshu minzu 少數民族
Sinbei 新北
Su Chi 蘇起
Su Jia-chyuan 蘇嘉全
Su Tseng-chang 蘇貞昌
Taichung 台中
Tainan 台南
Taipei 台北
Taishang 台商
Taitung 台東
Tangwai 黨外
Taoyuan 桃園
teshu guo yu guo guanxi 特殊國與國關係
Tsai Eng-meng 蔡衍明
Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文
Vincent Siew (Hsiao Wan-chang) 蕭萬長
William Lai Ching-te 賴清德 
Wu Den-yih 呉敦義 
Wu Po-hsiung 呉伯雄 
yi bian yi guo 一邊一國
yi ge Zhongguo, ge zi biaoshu 一個中國，各自表述
yi zhong ge biao 一中各表 
Yunlin 雲林
Zhonghua minzu 中華民族
zuqun 族群
